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Abstract—Adversarial examples in machine learning for im-
ages are widely publicized and explored. Illustrations of mis-
classifications caused by slightly perturbed inputs are abundant
and commonly known (e.g., a picture of panda imperceptibly
perturbed to fool the classifier into incorrectly labeling it as
a gibbon). Similar attacks on deep learning (DL) for radio
frequency (RF) signals and their mitigation strategies are scarcely
addressed in the published work. Yet, RF adversarial exam-
ples (AdExs) with minimal waveform perturbations can cause
drastic, targeted misclassification results, particularly against
spectrum sensing/survey applications (e.g. BPSK is mistaken for
8-PSK). Our research on deep learning AdExs and proposed
defense mechanisms are RF-centric, and incorporate physical-
world, over-the-air (OTA) effects. We herein present defense
mechanisms based on pre-training the target classifier using
an autoencoder. Our results validate this approach as a viable
mitigation method to subvert adversarial attacks against deep
learning-based communications and radar sensing systems.
I. INTRO
A new research direction is emerging in the field of wireless
communications, aiming to develop and evaluate deep learning
(DL) approaches against classical detection and estimation
methods in the radio frequency (RF) realm. Spectrum sensing,
especially in the context of cognitive radio, encompasses most
of the radio signal detection problems that are being addressed.
The approach to DL in the RF domain differs greatly from
the common current DL applications (e.g. image recognition,
natural language processing) and requires special knowledge
of RF signal processing and wireless communications and/or
radar, depending on the signal utilization. While research on
adversarial examples in machine learning for images has been
prolific, similar attacks on deep learning of radio frequency
(RF) signals and the mitigation strategies are scarcely ad-
dressed in the published work, with only a couple of recent
publications on RF [1], [2]. Adversarial examples (AdExs)
are slightly perturbed inputs that are classified incorrectly by
the Machine Learning (ML) model [3]. This perturbation is
achieved by mathematical processing of the signal, e.g., by
adding an incremental value in the direction of the classi-
fiers gradient with respect to the inputs (as in the FGSM
attack illustrated in Fig. 3 A), or by solving a constrained
optimization problem. Popular deep learning (DL) models
are even more vulnerable to AdExs as DL networks learn
input-output mappings that are fairly discontinuous. Consider
the images in Figure 1 [4]. The image on the left is the
original image of a panda from the ImageNet dataset [5],
while the one on the right is derived from it by applying
Fig. 1. Famous panda illustration of an adversarial image example against a
DL classifier where a visually imperceptible, noise-like perturbation can fool
the classifier to label it as gibbon
an FGSM attack of very low intensity. The perturbation of
0.007 added in the direction of the loss gradient corresponds
here to the magnitude of the smallest bit of the normalized
8-bit RGB pixel encoding of the image. This is sufficient to
elicit the GoogLeNet [6] to misclasify it as a gibbon. For
further details about AdExs, please see seminal work, such
as [3], [4]. Likewise for RF, adversarial examples can cause
drastic, targeted misclassification results mostly in spectrum
sensing/ survey applications (e.g. BPSK mistaken for 8-PSK)
with minimal waveform perturbation. However, it is not clear if
the RF AdExs maintain their effects in the physical world, i.e.,
when AdExs are delivered over-the-air (OTA). Our research
on deep learning AdExs and proposed defense mechanisms
are RF-centric, and incorporate physical-world, OTA effects.
In this work we present defense mechanisms based on pre-
training deep learning classifiers in the RF domain by an
autoencoder (AE) of the matching architecture.
1) Existing Work: The research in the area of RF-based
DL of the PHY layer is still embryonic [7]. Modulation
recognition (ModRec) is the most popular application of DL
here. Most of the existing work is based on convolutional
(CNN) architectures [8]. Paper [9] features an in-depth study
on the performance of DL ModRec methods on OTA captured
RF communication signals synthetically designed in Software
Defined Radio (SDR). The paper [9] demonstrates that in the
ModRec context DL provides significant performance benefits
compared to conventional feature extraction methods. Apart
from exploring optimal DL architectures and comparing their
classification accuracy with state-of-the-art performance based
on signal cumulants or their cyclo-stationary properties [10],
this paper contributed a publicly available dataset [11], which
we use here to demonstrate launching and mitigation of the
ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
08
03
4v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
P]
  1
6 F
eb
 20
19
attacks on DL that leverage adversarial examples of RF data
points.
There are many methods to create AdExs. By definition,
the following optimization problem describes the general
approach:
min ||rx||p
s.t.`(x) 6= `(x+ rx), and
x+ rx ∈X , (1)
where || · ||p denotes the lp norm, and `(x,θ) is the decision
rule by the NN with parameters θ evaluated at x. The final
constraint is somewhat arbitrary: it means that the adversarial
example still belongs to the same space as the legitimate data
point. Most current attacks are based on the gradient of a
neural networks loss function: White-box attacks use the target
NN to compute the gradient; Black-box attacks use a surrogate
network to approximate the gradient. We will be using Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [4] to illustrate our ideas. This
attack takes the sign of the gradient and moves the data point
x one step in that direction.
xˆ = x+ εsign(∇xJ(x,yadv)),
where x is the legitimate data point, and xˆ is its adversarial
example. J(x,yadv) is the loss function for input x evaluated
for the targeted label. We denoted the targeted (adversarial
classification) label as yadv, which can be constant, or a
random value, and the hyperparameter ε is usually a small
number to limit the perturbation (note its value, ε = 0.07, in
Figure 1).
FGSM is a simple attack and, at the same time, a basic
principle used in iterative attack methods and constrained-
optimization-based methods, hence representing a good ref-
erence for evaluation of new defense approaches. Some
common iterative methods based on FGSM include: Basic
iterative method (multiple steps of FGSM) [12], Carlini-
Wagner method [13] (similar but modified objective function),
Projected Gradient Descent (add noise, compute gradient, step,
project back) [14].
II. ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES: PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider this scenario for an OTA attack on an RF DL
classifier as a motivating example (Fig. 2). The DL attacker
(DLA) is at the transmitter of a communication system. Both
DLA and the attacked system (AS) are using software defined
radios (SDRs), although the DLA′s receiver does not have to
be based on an SDR. The DLA′s goal is to elicit adversarial
classification yadv at the AS on the signal x designed based
on a legitimate signal of class y. Despite the adversarial
modifications targeted to elicit classification different from y,
the designed AdEx needs to maintain high probability of being
decoded as y at the attacker′s own intended receiver, hence the
perturbation of x is constrained.
The AS is sensing the spectrum in order to perform reactive
jamming, e.g., to jam BPSK modulated waveforms that are
part of traffic signaling (preambles, control-plane packets),
Fig. 2. Motivating scenario for an OTA attack to DL classifier via RF AdExs
which if corrupted makes the rest of communication meaning-
less. Note that many preambles are BPSK-modulated, as well
as the packets in the control plane of most protocols (such as
acknowledgments), and if the they get corrupted by jamming
the whole data packet is lost [15]. Hence, the DLA would want
to create the AdEx that disguises BPSK as QPSK (or other)
to avoid the EW attack by the DL-based reactive jammer (i.e.,
AS) [16]. Note that reactive jamming is very difficult to detect
[17], but it heavily relies on the inference based on spectrum
sensing. If the inference is adversarially attacked, the jammer
will be mitigated (by failing to reactively transmit a jamming
signal). We here take the side of the jammer in attempting to
detect such adversarial attacks.
In the case of images the slight perturbation applied to a
legitimate data example is expressed as visual imperceptibility
by a human viewer. RF adversarial examples is a nascent
field, and as such the definition of imperceptible perturbation
does not exist in the literature. For RF signals utilized for
communications we define the imperceptible perturbation as
any deformation of the RF waveform that can be filtered out by
a receiver, e.g. via matched filters or correction codes, such
that the bit-error rate is close to that of legitimate signals.
An analogous definition can be made for radar using receiver
operating characteristics (ROC).
Mitigating adversarial inputs remains an open problem, even
in the image-domain. A complicating factor in detecting AdEx
attacks include variations due to the physical world. Visual
adversarial perturbations and their robustness given different
backgrounds, lighting, and camera resolutions is discussed in
[18]. The diversity of RF communications, radar, and spectrum
sensing systems, and complex propagation channels makes this
problem in the RF domain even more complex and unique. The
effect of the channel (or interference) which is mitigated in
well-designed communications receivers will persist at the DL
classifier, thus changing the classification for both legitimate
inputs and AdExs. Although we reflect on these issues, the
proper consideration and modeling of the both hardware and
the RF channel are outside the scope of this paper.
The defense mechanisms that we are proposing here rely on
pre-training the DL classifier using an autoencoder. The idea of
pre-training the classifier using an autoencoder is not new [19]
but our implementation and evaluation of this method is unique
and crafted for RF signals. Some features of the RF waveform
are corrupted during OTA delivery unintentionally, some are
changed due to an adversarial attack. The autoencoder is
expected to filter out non-salient features, which may lower the
accuracy of classification, but also make it more robust to the
adversarial and physical corruption. Common approaches to
defense against adversarial attacks (mainly evaluated on image
datasets) include: Gradient masking - hiding the gradient;
Preprocessing - trying to undo the perturbations; Detecting
AdExs - looking for distribution shifts; Certified methods
- proving immunity to a set of perturbations. For details
please see [20] and references therein. Preprocessing is the
closest of these strategies to the autoencoder-based method
since the autoencoder operates by projecting the inputs into a
space of lower dimensionality and filtering out the adversarial
perturbations.
Finally, adversarial training of neural networks is another
common defense, and often complimentary to other methods.
It consists of generating the AdExs according to one or more
attack methods, and retraining the NN with labeled AdExs. We
use adversarial training in conjunction with other mitigation
and defense methods.
There are some complexities in DL of RF signals that we
would like to highlight since our approach to solving those
complexities impacts the presented results. Raw RF signal data
is complex-valued, and traditionally split into the in-phase (I)
and quadrature (Q) channels, resulting in a series of I + jQ
samples. Standard DL networks are not designed to handle
complex-valued data, hence we must apply a transform to
the real domain that preserves salient signal information. Our
prior research leveraged expert feature transforms (e.g. FFTs,
wavelets) to optimize performance by reducing the complexity
(e.g. number of NN parameters) of the proceeding network.
For this research we used interleaved I/Q samples of the
DeepSig dataset comprised of synthetic data points from 24
modulation classes [11]. This simple transform from complex
to real set, could be expressed as follows: for a data point c of
k I/Q samples c1, · · · ,ck, where c`= I`+ j∗Q`, the transformed
vector has 2k real elements [I1,Q1, I2,Q2, · · · , Ik,Qk] . For the
Deepsig dataset that we used k = 1024, hence the input to the
NN is a tensor of dimensions (·,2048) . Note that despite the
conversion from complex data to the interleaved I/Q transform
the accuracy of classifying four modulations represented by a
subset of the DeepSig dataset gets close to 100% if data points
with SNR≥ 14 dB are used (see Figures 5 and 8). Adversarial
examples with ε = 0.1 lower the accuracy by 30% or more on
average.
The bottom (C) of Figure 3 shows 100 in-phase samples
of a QPSK adversarial example (red) and its legitimate coun-
terpart (blue). Similar effect is observed for the quadrature
component. Neither I nor Q samples visually change much
for a small perturbation ε (FGSM with ε = 0.1). However,
the modification induced on the signal amplitude (top right -
B) is more pronounced, and depending on the ε value this may
have other effects at the receiver. Note that the B plot shows
25 amplitude samples (from 50 samples of the data point).
A: Basics of AdEx design B: Effect on a QPSK signal amplitude
C: Effect on a QPSK data point (in-phase)
Fig. 3. FGSM Attack (A) and its effect on a modulated RF signal (B) and
its data point (C)
Fig. 4. Architecture of the 1D-CNN classifier that was both classically trained
and pre-trained by autoencoder; x = 4, y = 256
III. PROPOSED METHOD FOR MITIGATION OF
ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
All the results presented here are based on a subset of
the DeepSig dataset specifically BPSK, QPSK, 8PSK and
16QAM (DeepSig classes 3, 4 ,5, 12). We applied the FGSM
attack using the CleverHans library (12). We compared results
with and without the attack using Auto-encoder (AE) based
training and conventional training of the convolutional neural
network (CNN) presented in Figure 4.
We conducted the AE based training by training the AE′s
encoder of the same architecture as the CNN presented in
Figure 4, and then transferring the weights to the CNN
classifier. The architecture of the AE consisted of such an
encoder (red in Figure 6), and the decoder (green in Figure 6 ),
which is the encoders mirror image. Notice from Figure 4 that
the encoder consisted of several blocks of 1-D convolutional
and max-pooling layers, with layers widths narrowing down
from 2048 to 256 neurons. Mirroring replaces 1-D convolu-
tions with deconvolutions, and max-pooling with the matching
upsampling. The process of training the classifier based on the
AE training is shown in Figure 6, where the AE is trained to
minimize the mean-square error (MSE) distance between the
Fig. 5. Accuracy (over training epochs) of a 1D-CNN classifier when
classically trained, vs pre-trained by autoencoder, for both legitimate data
and FGSM AdExs
Fig. 6. AE-based training
input and output.
Figure 5 plots the classification accuracy of the 4 modula-
tions with and without an FGSM attack (ε = 0.1), utilizing
dashed lines for the AE-trained classifier (red for legitimate
data, blue for adversarial). Note that the legitimate accuracy
of the AE-trained classifier is fixed, as Figure 5 (and Fig-
ure 5 too) plots the accuracy over the training epochs of the
classically trained classifier (i.e., once the AE-based classifier
is already trained). Although this is hard to see for the AE-
based network, this kind of plotting makes the adversarial
accuracy for both DL networks non-constant since adversarial
examples are created at each training epoch based on the
current loss function. Nevertheless, Figure 5 shows how the
AE training makes the network more resilient. This is for the
FGSM (ε = 0.1), but similar results are observed for other
attack methods. In addition, in Figures 8 to 10 we present how
the accuracy of each of the classified modulations is affected.
Figure 8 shows the confusion matrix for the unattacked CNN
network, and Figures 9 and 10 present confusion matrices for
the FGSM attacked CNNs, trained conventionally and by AE
pretraining, respectively.
The adversary can only assess the deployed network. He
would not know that the encoder layers have not been trained
on this network, and it approached the AdEx design in a
classical way by utilizing the loss function dependent on
Fig. 7. Accuracy (over training epochs) of a 1D-CNN classifier when
classically trained, vs pre-trained by autoencoder, with a grey-box FGSM
attack
Fig. 8. Confusion matrix of unattacked CNN trained on classes 3,4,5 and 12
(BPSK, QPSK, 8-PSK,16QAM)
the trained weights, which are know to him. This makes
his attack a white-box attack by definition, as the adversary
knows the network weights, the number and type of layers, the
number of convolutional channels and size of convolutional
kernels. An interesting effect is presented in Figure 7 when
a grey-box attack is performed, which is the weaker attack
when everything else but the actual weights are known. In
simpler terms, the adversarial examples are created on an
independently classically trained network, but applied to the
AE trained network. The AE-trained network still maintains
resilience against AdExs but the original network performs
slightly better for legitimate examples. This promising AE-
based defense can be further improved by drawing on our
research on channel-robust Stacked Denoising Autoencoder
(SDAE).
A. How the AE changes the separating hyper-planes
We have seen from Figures 5, 8, 9, 10 that the AE pre-
training significantly reduces the effect of FGSM adversarial
examples. The question that arises is whether we can combine
this kind of mitigation of the attack with the defense methods
based on detecting and discarding adversarial examples. To
address this we perform a statistical test that compares adver-
sarial and legitimate examples in two experiments: 1) when the
CNN network is not defended, and 2) when it is defended by
Fig. 9. Confusion matrix of the FGSM-attacked classically trained CNN for
classes 3,4,5 and 12 (BPSK, QPSK, 8-PSK,16QAM)
Fig. 10. Confusion matrix of FGSM-attacked AE-pretrained CNN trained on
classes 3,4,5 and 12 (BPSK, QPSK, 8-PSK,16QAM)
the AE-based pretraining. The test that utilizes the output of
the Softmax layer is motivated by Figures 11 and 12. Note that
we refer to the class probabilities computed by the Softmax
layer as the outputs of the classifier:
P(y = c|x) = exp(w
T
c f (x)+bc)
∑i∈C exp(wi f (x)+bi)
, (2)
where c ∈ C, C is the set of classes that we perform the
inference on, and wc and bc are the weight and the bias of the
Softmax layer for class c. f (x) is the input to that layer for
each data point x. For the sake of visualization, both figures
are based on the 3-class classifier trained on BPSK, QPSK
and 8-PSK modulation data points. Hence, the outputs of the
Softmax layer are 3-dimensional vectors that are plotted in
the figures for all data points utilized for training (close to
20,000, shown on the left), and for their adversarial examples,
shown in the plot on the right. The elements of the vectors
are values between 0 and 1, representing the probabilities of
the classes (2). Figure 11 shows these vectors after 40 epochs
of training the CNN network conventionally, which is upon
the convergence of the loss function and after the achieved
accuracy exceeded 99%. Figure 12 shows the same after the
AE-trained network has converged to its optimal performance.
legitimate adversarial
Fig. 11. Classically trained classification of 3 modulations (BPSK, QPSK,8-
PSK) shows very different distribution of output probabilities between legiti-
mate and adversarial examples after 40 training epochs
legitimate adversarial
Fig. 12. AE-pretrained classification of 3 modulations (BPSK, QPSK,8-PSK)
shows very different distribution of output probabilities between legitimate and
adversarial examples after 40 training epochs
It is easy to see that the AE training changes the distribu-
tion of legitimate, and especially adversarial outputs. Let us
observe first that in Figure 12-left, representing legitimate
examples, the BPSK-classified data points (purple) cluster in
the area close to the vertex (1,0,0), denoting the probability
of 1 for BPSK and 0 for QPSK and 8-PSK. Similarly, the
points classified as QPSK and 8-PSK cluster around the
vertices corresponding to probability of 1 for QPSK and 8-
PSK, respectively. The left-hand side of Figure 11 shows the
similar effects for conventionally trained network, although
the outputs for each classification are more smeared, which
matches the accuracy plot in Figure 5. The right-hand side of
Figure 11 shows that the output vectors for the adversarial
examples of a conventionally trained CNN are distributed
across a wide range of values, and the clusterization effect
is lost. The same plot on the right-hand side of Figure 12
shows less variance in the adversarial outputs, i.e., they are
projected along a couple of lines.
B. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Output Layer Probabilities
This Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) two-sample test (see [21]
and references therein) is performed on the two sets of vector
Table 1 Table 2
Fig. 13. KS-test results, based on output probabilities (2), for experiment
with classically trained CNN (left), and another with AE-trained CNN (right)
outputs of the classifier. We performed each of the tests for
the two experiments described above - one with outputs from
conventionally trained CNN network, and another with the
AE-pretrained outputs. Columns of the tables in Figure 13
show for each experiment the 3 instances of the 2-sample KS
test between the outputs: 1) Entire legitimate output dataset
per class vs. entire adversarial output dataset per predicted
class; 2) A random set of 50 legitimate output vectors of the
same class vs a random set of 50 same-class adversarial output
values 3) Control instance (legitimate to legitimate outputs, per
class), with a random set of 50 outputs each.
The KS test declares the confidence (p-value) that the two
sets of statistics are from the same distribution. Tables in
Figure 13 display those confidence values for the 3 instances
described above. Small confidence in the 1st and 2nd column
show that AdExs are not drawn from the same distribution
as the original data, and can thus be detected using this test.
The 3rd column quantifies the confidence in such a claim, with
one being the highest confidence. We see that Table 2 (AE-
trained classifier) has much lower confidence in the outcomes
of statistical tests, which is expected. This is especially true for
small size statistics (50 samples), i.e., if we want to conduct the
test in real time, and for a higher order modulation. Obviously,
the test design should be more sensitive when used along with
mitigation strategies, and/or a belief network must be used to
adapt the decision based on other outcomes. For additional
information regarding the KS-based tests aimed to detect and
discard RF adversarial examples please see out prior work in
[2]. The KS test based on the output probabilities will likely
show different results when evaluated at a classifier that is
trained on clean RF samples but receives the data points OTA,
which causes a different distribution shift due to the channel
effects. We plan to evaluate these effects in future work.
IV. CONCLUSION
We showed that pre-training deep learning classifiers in the
RF domain by an autoencoder (AE) mitigates the deceiving
effect of adversarial examples (AdExs). The classifier that we
designed for evaluation of this defense method is based on sev-
eral 1-dimensional convolutional and max-pooling layers, and
two regularized dense layers at the bottom of the network. The
classification accuracy of the trained network was satisfactory
on the legitimate dataset, which consists of four differently
modulated RF signals. Despite the improvements due to AE-
based pretraining, there is some residual decrease in the
accuracy of the attacked classifier that should be addressed by
different methods. We intend to address this in our future work
by expanding the AE-based defense to a denoising AE, which
is also likely to increase its robustness against the receiver
noise, i.e., unintentional input corruption. We also explored if
we can combine this kind of mitigation of the attack with the
defense methods based on detecting and discarding adversarial
examples. We show that detection methods based on the
statistical tests to detect a distribution shift of the values at
the output of the DL classifier are not as effective as when
applied to an undefended classifier. This should be considered
when the detection and mitigation by pretraining are combined
to strengthen the classifier′ robustness to adversarial attacks.
The validity of the proposed defense should be verified in
terms of robustness to corruption incurred at the receiver due
to over-the-air delivery of RF data points, which we plan to
evaluate in future work.
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